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Abstract- Malware is becoming an epidemic in computer 
network nowadays. Malware attacks are a significant threat 
to networks. A conducted survey shows malware attacks 
may result a huge financial impact. This scenario has be-
come worse when users are migrating to a new environment 
which is Internet Protocol Version 6. In this paper, a real 
Nimda worm was released on a network to further under-
stand the worm behavior in real network traffic. A con-
trolled environment of IPv6 networks were deployed as a 
testbed for this study. The result between these two scena-
rios on different operating system platforms will be ana-
lyzed and discussed further in term of the worm behavior. 
The experiment result shows that even IPv4 malware still 
can infect the IPv6 network environment without any mod-
ification on the existing malware. In addition, the worm 
behaves differently in different operating system. A statis-
tical approach will be used to validate the result. New detec-
tion techniques need to be proposed to remedy this problem 
swiftly.  
Keywords: IPv6; malware; IDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IPv6 was introduced as a new network protocols 
which is meant to overcome IPv4 problems which offer-
ing features such as a large number of address flexible 
addressing scheme, more efficient packet forwarding,  
more secure communication, better support for mobility 
and many more [1]. Although IPv6 offers a lot of bene-
fits, people are still reluctant to totally migrate from IPv4 
to IPv6 network. This is because even IPv6 have been 
deployed for many years, this protocol is still considered 
in its infancy [2]. Many researchers have spent ample of 
time to enhance the IPv6 services to become at least at 
par with IPv4 addresses. Since IPv4 addresses are facing 
depletion, migrating to IPv6 is inevitable eventually [3-
5]. Some studies claimed that IPv6 cause many security 
issues [6-9]. However, researchers pay little attention on 
IPv6 security issues[10]. In fact, intruders are intended to 
fully exploit vulnerabilities occur during this transition 
period. Studies show that new age malwares can survive 
in new network environment [11, 12]. Hence, researchers 
agree that further studies have to be conducted to remedy 
the malware infection issues [13-16]. 
Malware is software which rapidly invented to mani-
pulate vulnerabilities of computer networks. Based on 
[17], 250 new malware variants were introduced every-
day from all over the world. These so called new age 
malwares were not totally new genuine ones but rather 
innovated from the existing malware. These malwares 
were modified and some modules were added to it to 
avoid being detected from the anti-virus software which 
is using signature patterns to detect malwares.  
Malware is becoming an epidemic in computer net-
work nowadays[18]. Malware attacks are a significant 
threat to networks. A conducted survey shows malware 
attacks may result a huge financial impact[19]. This sce-
nario is becoming worse when users are migrating to a 
new environment which is IPv6. A study shows that even 
IPv4 malware still can infect the IPv6 network environ-
ment without any modification[20]. 
Each of different network users has their own needs 
and preferences[21]. It is a flaw to assume all of network 
users are using the same operating system even within 
the same enterprise. Hence, it is necessary to assess the 
impact of using different operating systems platform in 
term of malware attack. 
The objective of this study is to analyze malware be-
havior in different operating system platforms namely 
Windows XP SP1 and Windows Vista SP1.  
In the following sections, the paper will explain about 
some related works to this study and followed by the 
methodology used in this experimental research. The 
experimental design will be explained and some result 
and analysis will be discussed. The Kruskal Wallis Test 
will be used to validate the difference between data ga-
thered from the testbed simulation. Finally, the conclu-
sion for the overall study will be stated in the end of this 
paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Malware 
Malware are represented by several forms namely vi-
rus, Trojan, spyware, adware and worms [22, 23]. Each 
of them has different characteristics to attack their vic-
tims. Their method of propagation also varied including 
sharing memory sticks, downloading files, peer-to-peer 
applications, sharing file and many more.  
Many activities can help these malware propagate 
more easily. Unfortunately, most of end-users are not 
fully aware of it due to lack of knowledge about this is-
sue. We have classified this propagation in two catego-
ries namely human intervention and self-propagation. In 
this study, we are focusing on self-propagation category 
which is worm the only malware form falls in this cate-
gory [20]. 
B. The difference between operating systems 
2011 IEEE Conference on Open Systems (ICOS2011), September 25 - 28, 2011, Langkawi, Malaysia978-1-61284-931-7/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE 74
Mohamed has conducted studies on the impact of us-
ing different operating systems in IPv6 network which a 
few parameters have been taken into consideration [24, 
25]. The study shows different operating systems give 
impact on its performance due to the difference of its 
system architecture. Thus, this study is focusing on the 
difference between two different Windows distributions 
namely Windows XP and Windows Vista on worm prop-
agation. The study should reveal whether the packet pat-
terns, targeted ports and protocol used are the same be-
tween these two operating systems after a node has been 
infected by a malware. 
C. Worm Propagation Model 
Till this point of time, many researchers had con-
ducted theoretical model studies on worm propagation 
issues in IPv6 network. The problem with IPv6 network 
is there is lack of IPv6 data traffic to be used for analysis.  
Zhoawen has analyzed the Internet worm modeling in 
IPv4 and IPv6 [26]. Whereas, Liu has conducted a study 
on worm behavior in dual-stack network but the result 
was based on simulation where the seed was based on 
estimation [27]. While, Zhang has conducted a study and 
proposed a control mechanism for worm propagation by 
using SIRS model [28]. In this case, most of the con-
ducted studies have revealed their models which related 
to the malware propagation. Nevertheless, the models 
still need to be validated by using a real network envi-
ronment. As Mehmood said in his paper, the theoretical 
study is important to understand the basic characteristics 
about an issue. However, the result must be verified by 
using a real hardware[29].  
Thus, this study is focusing on release a real worm on 
a real live isolated network to observe its behavior in 
general. Even so, the result is still can be improved by 
using more complex network which may replicating a 
real network environment. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In Figure 1, a sequence of schematic work flow has 
been designed as a process of malware detection. 
Start
Prepare the clean 
testbed
IPv6 Nodes 
infected?
Release worm on 
the testbed
Identify the 
network traffic 
behavior
Identify the attack 
pattern on IPv6 
nodes
IPv6 Network 
infected?
Differentiate between 
normal and anomaly 
network traffic
Find other malware which 
infecting IPv6 nodes
End
YES NO
NOYES
 
Figure 1: Malware Detection Framework 
In order to test the IPv4 worm behavior on different 
operating system platforms in IPv6 network environment, 
two testbeds have been implemented. The nodes setup 
and configuration are identical except for the operating 
system installed on the computers are different. The 
testbed designed for this study can be found in Figure 2. 
Before the worm released, a clean testbed need to be 
ready. Some worms will remain in the memory even after 
the virus was cleaned by the antivirus software. There-
fore, each computer was cleaned thoroughly including 
formatting used computers to ensure no other factors will 
affect the result later on. The original configuration for 
computers, router and switch involve were restored. 
After the clean testbed ready, the packet sniffer tool 
was activated to capture all packets through the gateway 
router. Then, the worm was released at once to allow the 
worm to propagate the effect throughout the network. 
The gateway router is essential in this experiment is be-
cause to simulate as if this environment is accessible to 
the other networks. Hence, this design deceived the worm 
to launch its attack to broader scale rather than local area 
network only.  
A study shows that the IPv4 worm still can survive in 
IPv6 network environment [20]. Although it not affects 
IPv6 nodes directly, the attack still cause a lot of band-
width consumption. A further study needs to be con-
ducted to analyze the impact of the worm attack on dif-
ferent operating system platform in term of bandwidth 
consumption and port vulnerabilities. Technically, the 
newer operating system may have sturdier security de-
fense compares to the previous one. Towards the end of 
this paper, the result will prove whether the common 
belief is valid or not.  
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
In this experiment, the network layout used as depicted in 
Figure 2. Based on Figure 2, three computers had been 
setup in this testbed namely PC1, PC2 and PC3. PC1 was 
installed a packet sniffer software to capture all traffic 
through the gateway router trunk. PC2 and PC3 work as 
nodes in the same network where PC2 as the source who 
release the worm. Each scenario used different operating 
system platform and Nimda variant E as the worm used 
in the experiment. Duration for each scenario is about 
three hours. 
 
Network Add Used:
à 2001:1:1:1::0/64
1st Sc: Windows XP SP1
2nd Sc: Windows Vista SP1
PC1
PC2 PC3
Gateway Router
Trunk Port mirror
Fa0/5
Fa0/2
Fa0/3
Fa0/1
Fa0/0
 
Figure 2: Testbed Network Layout 
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The procedure of this experiment is as the following: 
S1. Ready all computers, router and switch. Restore 
default configurations into those computers, rou-
ter and switch. 
S2. Leave the computers for two minutes to ensure the 
network traffic has become stable.  
S3. Activate the packet capture software on PC1 to 
start capture the packet through the gateway link. 
S4. Start releases the Nimda.E worm from PC2. 
S5. Leave the testbed for three hours to allow some 
time for the worm to launch its attack on the net-
work. 
S6. Plug out all cables connected to computer to stop 
the simulation and save the network traffic log 
from PC1 for further analysis. 
S7. Before starts the next experiment session, all 
computers must be formatted to ensure it is free 
from worm infection in operating system and in its   
memory. 
V. RESULT & ANALYSIS 
A. The First Scenario 
In this scenario, Windows XP SP1 will be used as the 
nodes’ operating system. The network address used for 
this scenario is 2001:1:1:1::0/64 as stated in Figure 2. 
Before we released the worm, we ensure everything 
properly configured and we left the testbed for a few mi-
nutes to make sure the network stabilized. 
After the network stable, the packet sniffer in PC1 
was activated then the worm released in the network. 
Each packet through the link between the gateway router 
and the switch was copied to the trunk port. The packets 
were captured by a packet sniffer tool which installed in 
PC1. After three hours duration, the data collection was 
stopped and the log was saved for further analysis.  
Figure 3 shows the sample of packet captured plotted 
in a line graph. This line represented the total number of 
packets captured through the gateway router link in 
bucket of 10 sec. Based on Figure 3, the line was consis-
tently located at 150 units which meant within 10 
seconds, 150 packets went through the gateway.  
 
Figure 3: Network Traffic pattern after Nimda.E 
worm released in Windows XP SP1 
Once further analysis on the dataset is completed, the 
following information was compiled in Table I and Fig-
ure 4. 
TABLE I: Input from dataset in Scenario 1 
Type of Protocol used UDP, TCP and Others 
The Most Type of Pro-
tocol used 
UDP - 91.35% 
Port number connected 67, 137 and 138  
The Most Port number 
connected 
67 (Bootstrap Protocol) 
Average Number of 
packet per minute 
155.89 pkt/min 
Targeted IP Addresses IPv4 addresses (APIPA) 
Based on Table I, some significant information was 
extracted from the dataset. The most significant protocol 
used was UDP with more than 91% from the overall 
packets through the gateway router. The number of vul-
nerable ports is three and port 67 which was meant for 
bootstrap protocol scored the highest frequency. In addi-
tion, the average number of packets through the gateway 
router is about 155 packets per minute.  
Since the worm used is cultivated only for IPv4 net-
work, hence the targeted IP protocol is IPv4 network. 
However, there is no valid IPv4 configuration on the 
node as the node only activated IPv6 network configura-
tion. Hence, the worm launched its attack to Automatic 
Private IP Addressing (APIPA) which the configuration 
is automatically configured by Windows operating sys-
tem if there is no valid network configuration found.  
Whereas in Figure 4 shows the distribution of number 
of packets released by Nimda worm in Windows XP 
within a minute throughout three hours data collection. 
From the figure, it can be seen that most of the time, 160 
packets went through the gateway router link in a minute. 
This distribution is normal because it is supported by the 
fact that the mean and median values are more or less the 
same which is 159.89 and 160.00 respectively.  
 
Figure 4: The Distribution of Number of Packet Re-
leased by Nimda in Windows XP 
B. The Second Scenario 
In this scenario the network layout and the computers 
setup were identical with the previous scenario except 
Windows Vista SP1 is used as nodes’ platform this time. 
The network address for this scenario is 2001:1:1:1::0/64. 
The procedure is still the same as in the previous experi-
ment.  
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Figure 5 shows the sample of packet captured plotted 
in a line graph. This line represented the total number of 
packets captured through the gateway router link in 
bucket of 10 sec. Based on Figure 5, the line was fluc-
tuated around 50 units which meant within 10 seconds, 
50 packets went through the gateway.  
 
Figure 5: Network Traffic pattern after Nimda.E 
worm released in Windows Vista SP1 
Table II and Figure 6 summarized the result compila-
tion of dataset analysis in Scenario 2. 
TABLE II: Input from dataset in Scenario 2 
Type of Protocol used UDP and Others 
The Most Type of Proto-
col used 
UDP – 97.7% 
Port number connected 67, 137, 138, 3702, 5355 
and 1900 
The Most Port number 
connected 
1900 (Windows Messen-
ger Broadcast) 
Average Number of 
packet per minute 
33.61 pkt/min 
Targeted IP Addresses IPv4 addresses (APIPA) 
 
Based on Table II, some significant information was 
extracted from the dataset. The most significant protocol 
used was UDP with more than 97% from the overall 
packets through the gateway router. The number of vul-
nerable ports is six and port 1900 which was meant for 
Windows Messenger Broadcast scored the highest fre-
quency. In addition, the average number of packets went 
through the gateway router is about 33 packets per 
minute.  
Since this worm used is cultivated only for IPv4 net-
work, hence the targeted IP protocol is IPv4 network. 
However, there is no valid IPv4 configuration on the 
node as those nodes only activated IPv6 protocol. Hence, 
the worm sent packets to APIPA same as in the previous 
scenario.  
Whereas in Figure 6 shows the distribution of number 
of packets released by Nimda worm in Windows Vista 
within a minute throughout two hours data collection. 
From the figure, it shows that the distribution is not nor-
mal because it is supported by the fact that mean and 
median values are different which is 33.61 and 48.00 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6: The Distribution of Number of Packets Re-
leased by Nimda in Windows Vista 
VI. THE EXPERIMENT RESULT ANALYSIS 
This paper uses statistical analysis approach to ana-
lyses the outputs from both datasets. Based on the distri-
bution patterns of datasets which cannot be assumed as 
normal distribution, a nonparametric T-test is used to 
determine for a difference between these two group data-
sets independently. Kruskal-Wallis is a nonparametric 
test that able to test whether a single factor can affect a 
group differently. In this study, kruskal –Walis test is 
used to determine whether there is difference in number 
packets sents in a second (Num_Packet) between two 
observed operating systems. The results of the test are as 
shown in Table III and Table IV. 
Table III is the Rank table shows the both OS are 
ranked based on the mean rank which XP released more 
number of packet compares to Windows Vista.  
TABLE III: Kruskal Wallis Test 
Rank 
OS N Mean Rank 
Num Packet            XP 36 54.50 
                              Vista 36 18.50 
                              Total 72  
 
TABLE IV: Statistical Test Grouping by OS 
     Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Num_Packet 
Chi-Square 
df 
Asymp. Sig. 
55.849 
1 
.000 
 
 
Meanwhile, Table IV shows the test statistic table to 
test null hypothesis that the number of packet affected 
both operating system is same. However, the significant 
level value Asymp. Sig. of P<0.01 in this test statistic 
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table indicates that there is a significant difference of 
number packet between Windows XP and Windows Vis-
ta.  
TABLE V: Comparison between Windows XP and 
Windows Vista 
Item Windows XP Windows Vista 
The Most Protocol 
Used 
UDP - 91.35% UDP – 97% 
Average Number of 
Packet Released 
155.89 pkt/min 33.61 pkt/min 
Number of Vulnera-
ble Port 
3 6 
The Most Used Port 67 (Bootstrap 
Protocol) 
1900 (Windows 
Messenger 
Broadcast) 
Targeted IP Protocol IPv4 Addresses 
(APIPA) 
IPv4 Addresses 
(APIPA) 
Packet Distribution  Normal Not Normal 
Table V shows the comparison the impact of Nim-
da.E variant impact on Windows XP and Windows Vista 
platform. Based on the table, it shows that the worm re-
leasing UDP packets when it tries to attack the network. 
Windows XP shows the worm release a lot more packets 
compares Windows Vista which mean network with 
Windows XP will easily congested with packets once this 
worm attack their network. 
The data also shows that Windows Vista has more 
vulnerable ports shall be taken in consideration compares 
to Windows XP. The most port used is 1900 which the 
connections were intended to search for upstream Inter-
net gateway. Further investigation found that all ports 
which the worm tries to connect have a potential risk for 
further exploitation.  
Since there is no valid IPv4 configuration set on those 
nodes in the experiment, the worm tended to use Auto-
matic Private IP Addressing (APIPA) as its destination 
address in both scenarios. APIPA is automatically ob-
tained by a Windows node once it does not have manual 
IP configuration and it failed to get it from any DHCP 
server.  
In term of packet distribution, Windows XP is easier 
to identify since it is considered as normal distribution. 
However, for Windows Vista it is a bit trickier to identify 
because the packet distribution is not normal as shown in 
Figure 6. 
VII. THE EXPERIMENT FINDINGS 
After two different scenarios executed and analyzed 
the conclusions for this study as the following: 
 Even IPv6 node infected, it still look for its victim in 
IPv4 network. This shows that IPv4 malware still 
can affect bandwidth consumption in IPv6 network 
environment without any modification made on the 
existing worm. 
 In term of attack impact, Windows XP is more se-
vere compares to Windows Vista because the num-
ber of packets released in Windows XP is really 
massive which is 155 packets per minute. This mean, 
Windows Vista has patched some potential risk oc-
curred in Windows XP. 
 Windows Vista has more vulnerable ports compares 
to Windows XP. Even the number of packets was 
reduced; Windows Vista opens more ports which led 
to potential risk to its node. 
 The malware activity is easier to detect in Windows 
XP because the packet distribution is normal and can 
be easily identified by setting normal profile ben-
chmarking. However, it is harder to identify malware 
attack activities for Windows Vista nodes as the 
packet distribution is not normal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Migrating from IPv4 to IPv6 is inevitable. Many re-
searchers put a lot of effort to ensure the IPv6 services 
and stability to be much better compares to IPv4. How-
ever, not many researchers pay enough attention on secu-
rity issues. The malware give severe impact on the net-
work which cause a lot of trouble to end users. This paper 
shows that malware which was invented for IPv4 net-
work still can affect IPv6 network without any modifica-
tion made on the existing malware. Even it does not at-
tack the IPv4 nodes; still it degrades the network perfor-
mance by releasing a lot of packets which led to band-
width consumption. The use of different operating system 
gives different impact on the network. A new operating 
system is not a total solution to solve problems occurred 
in the previous version operating system. Without proper 
monitoring and management, the impact cannot be ex-
pected even when we are using a newer operating system. 
The operating system is always needed to be patched 
from time to time to ensure the node will become safer 
from any type of attacks. 
For further research, a more realistic testbed need to 
be used to represent the real network environment. A 
heterogeneous platforms need to used as its give different 
impact on the malware propagation. Furthermore, a study 
on how this worm behaves in transition mechanism such 
as dual-stack also needs to be conducted to further under-
stand how the malware works. Finally, a new detection 
technique needs to be proposed to cater this issue. 
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